Brief history of the Palaung People and the Situation of the Palaung Land

The Palaung people are one of the indigenous nationalities of the multi-national country that is the Union of Burma. The Palaung people have a long history and a strong sense of their unique identity. They have their own language and literature, a distinctive traditional culture, their own territory and a self-sufficient economy. The Palaung are predominantly Buddhist with less then ten percent animist and Christians.

The Palaung people number over one million, and most live in the mountains of the north-western Shan State. However, large numbers also live in towns throughout the Southern and Eastern Shan State. The customary lands of the Palaung people have the richest ruby and sapphire mines in the world, including the famous Mogok mine area which has been cut out of Shan State and made a part of Sagaing Division by the Burman dictatorship. There are also many kinds of minerals in the Palaung lands including silver, zinc, gold and aluminium.
The Palaung are famous in Burma for the high quality tea that is grown in their highland farms. They also grow a variety of temperate climate fruit crops such as apples, plums, avocados and pears, which are highly valued in the lowland areas.

Unfortunately, the Palaung people have not been able to live and tend their lands in peace. for centuries they have suffered invasion of their territories by Burman and other armies. First, the Burman kings tried to extend their imperial reach into Palaung lands. Then came the British colonialists. They in turn were followed by the Japanese imperialists, shortly after world war II. The Chinese nationalist Kumintang moved into the lands of the Palaung where the Burman army fought them.In 1962 the Burman army staged a coup d'eta and formed the Burma Socialist Programmed Party. After this the Burman army committed many injustices against the people, and the Palaung people along with many other nationalities, took up arms against them. Then the BSPP regime encouraged gun running armed groups in the Shan State to become Ka Kwe Ye (people's militia ) to fight for the government against the indigenous nationalities armies. In 1968 the Burma Communist Party (BCP), backed by the Chinese communists also established bases in Palaung lands and fought against the Burmese. In 1988 the dictatorship was formed and called itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). One year later, the BCP collapsed from internal problems and spilt into different ethnic armies. Some of these immediately made cease-fires with the SLORC. In the Shan State the independent non-communist indigenous armies opposing the dictatorship found themselves facing all the troops the SLORC had deployed against the communists and some of the ex-communist ethnic armies as well. Facing the threat of annihilation the Pa-O army, some Kachin units based in the Shan State and some Shan armed forces made deals with the SLORC. The Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA) was left surrounded by a very large number of SLORC troops and had no choice must to sign a cease-fire agreement also. The Chinese Shan warlord Khun Sa spread his soldiers throughout the Shan State and forced many young Palaung to join his army which was attacked by the Burmese and sometimes the Wa cease-fire group.

Because of the long years of fighting, some Palaung villagers fled to more peaceful areas. Many become " internal refugees " trying to survive in remote areas in the hills of Shan State. Some, due to the brutal oppression of the Burmese armed forces and sometimes drug trafficking groups, fled to take refuge in the northern Thai border areas. some refugee settlements have been set up in Thailand for nearly 18 years. Since opium king pin Khun Sa's surrender on 1st January 1996 to the SLORC, many other Palaung villagers who had lived in areas under Khun Sa's control and whose family members had been forced to join his army have also fled to Thailand. Now there are around 3000 Palaung refugees in Thailand.

THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF THE PALAUNG PEOPLE

Before the British colonized Burma, the Palaung people were ruled by a hereditary Saobwa, or Prince who had his capital at Nam San township. For periods of their history, the Palaung were dominated by more numerous Burmans and were forced to pay tribute. At other periods they grew strong and achieved independence. The Palaung were enjoying a period of independence, following a period of Burman rule, when the British occupied the Shan State in 1886. During the colonial period and period of Burma's democratic rule up to 1962, the Palaung had limited autonomy, and it was not until the military coup by General Ne Win that a serious political and armed movement began in Palaung State.

The Palaung National Front was established by Sao Hso Lane on the 12th of January, 1963, at the time when national leaders from different parts of Shan State were being executed or imprisoned. The Palaung National Front PNF, fielding 600 men merged with the Shan State Army SSA. Sao Hao Lane later came to be the commander of the SSA, then president of the Shan State Progressive Party.

In 1976, Mai Kwan Tong, one of the military commanders of the PNF who had allied himself with the Kachin Independence Army KIA, set up a new political and military structure. The Palaung State Liberation Organization PSLO and its armed wing, the Palaung State Liberation Army PSLA was established on 12 February 1976. The 1000 strong army based itself in the Palaung heartland in the mountains between Namkham, Lashio and Maymyo. The PSLA fought many battles with the Burman army under the leadership of first Mai Kwan Tong, then Mai Than Lwin, Mai Aung Khaing, and finally Mai Kyaw Hla. In October 1986, closely allied under the National Democraties Front NDF banner with the KIA, and SSA, it was renamed the Palaung State Liberation Party under the chairmanship of Mai Aik Mong.

On the 27th of April 1991, a sad day for the Palaung people, without no choice and the PSLP/PSLA made a military cease-fire agreement with the SLORC regime.

However, some members of the party, dissatisfied with the SLORC's refusal to make an acceptable political settlement, then formed the Palaung State Liberation Front. The PSLF was established in Manerplaw in 1992 under the leadership of Chairman Mai Tin Maung. After the assassination of Mai Tin Maung in 1994 the PSLF elected Mai Joke Jar as the new chairman and Mai Aikphone General Secretary.

THE AIMS OF THE PALAUNG STATE LIBERATION FRONT (PSLF)

To topple the unique-party dictatorship and super-nationalism. To cease-fire nation wide and build the real of national unity and peace. To gain fundamental human rights and democratic rights according to international standards for all the palaung people. To establish a national state with the rights to self-determination for the palaung people. To establish a genuine federal union of burma comprised of the Palaung national state having equal standard of the rights to self-determination and anti-drug narcotic.

Before Palaung State Liberation Army cease-fire with the SLORC/SPDC

In 1990, the SLORC put pressure on the Palaug people to force the PSLA to negotiate with them. First, they cut of communications between the PSLA and the Palaung villagers. They forcibly relocated villages around Nam San and Man Tong into relocation sites. In the Nam San area, they moved about 25 villages to the village of Aram, Nam Lang, Hu Mang and Pang Saree which had a SLORC military base, and which is about 4-5 miles from Nam San Toungship. In the Man Tong area, they moved about 20 villages to the village of Ho Ko, Kjay Kour and in side Man Tong city which is only 2 miles from Man Tong township, which had a SLORC military base. Villages in Man Kham, Man Wee, Kot Kai and Nam Partka townships forced to moved in to the cities. They were relocated at the time when tea leaves were being harvested, the main cash crop of the Palaung, so the villagers could not harvest tea, and they had nothing to illness and malnutrition. It was mostly old people, mothers and pregnant women who died.

Several months after the relocation, villagers were allowed back to their tea plantations, but only if they had written permission. They were forbidden to take any rice with them to eat when they went to work, in case they gave it any to the Palaung soldiers. Most of the tea was no longer able to be picked by the time the villagers were able to return to their plantations. The villagers could only collect a small amount of tea, but they were forced to give half of it to the SLORC soldiers, who sold it to Chinese traders.

Because the local people could no longer get any income from their tea, they suffered great difficulties. They therefore begged the PSLA to negotiate with the SLORC. The PSLA felt that they had to heed the wishes of the people, and they feared that the situation of the villagers would get worse, so they agreed to negotiate with the SLORC. They reached a cease-fire agreement in 1991.After the cease-fire agreement, the relocated villagers were allowed to return home.

Conditions after the cease –fire

After the Palaung villagers were allowed to return home in 1991, they could return to tend their tea-plantations. The situation for the villagers was more stable, since the SLORC stopped collecting porters, and no longer raided the villages searching for the Palaung soldiers. They were able to set up more permanent tea-factories. However, they had to pay a lot of taxes to the SLORC. For example, they had to pay a tax to set up the factory; also tax on the amount of tea they purchased; tax on the tea they transported; tax on the Amount of firewood used; tax on the amount of dried tea produced. The total cost of the taxes amounted to about 70% of the total income earned from the tea.

Thus the SLORC have managed to make a lot of money from the Palling villagers follow the cease-fire. There have been no major benefits for the Palaung people following the cease-fire. The SLORC has not initiated any development projects in the area. Only the PSLA has carried out any development for the Palaung villagers.

Development situation

After the cease-fire agreement, the SLORC called the PSLA-controlled area "Special Region 7." the SLORC agreed to develop this area, but they did not in fact do anything. All of the development in the Palaung area has been done by the PSLA and the Palaung people them- selves. The car roads have been built by the villagers, who brought their own food to eat when working. Now, there are roads to most of the villages in the Palaung area. They have also created their own hydro-electric plants.

The SLORC agreed to pay 3 million kyat for the development of the Palaung area, but they have not spent anything up till now. However, one of the PSLP leaders said" If the SLORC can not develop our area, we have to develop it ourselves, as it is our area. In the future, every village must have a road and electricity for their survival. This is what we can do to develop our area. The SLORC does not develop the border areas in the same way as Central Burma. Even though we have joined with the SLORC, they are not clearly contributing to our development. They have only given the opportunity to people to carry out their personal business, to distract them from politics."

Education situation

After the 1991 cease-fire, the SLORC have allowed the PSLA to set up a Health Committee and an Education Committee to improve the health and education Conditions in the Palaung area. The Education Committee has organized the setting up of primary schools in every village in the PSLA controlled area. The teachers are chosen from each village. The villagers provide the salary and food of the teachers. The children who have completed 4th standard in the villages to go beyond 4th standard, and have sent teachers to some villages for this purpose. Some of the teachers are government teachers is not sufficient, so the villagers have to help support them with housing and food. To cope with the problem of poor students who need to further their schooling in the towns, the Education Committee has built boarding hostels in Sipaw, Nam San and Man Tong.

Health situation

The health situation is very bad in the Palaung area. Most of the villages have no health centre. Only the big villages with populations of over 200 houses have health centre. Where there are no health centre, the villagers have to rely on traditional medics, or people with some health knowledge. If anyone is very sick, they must be sent to the hospital in the closest town, but since owing to difficulties in transport, patients commonly die on the way.

Following the cease-fire, the PSLA Health Committee has been trying to address the health problems by training basic medics and midwives from each village. They are hoping to try and arrange for clinics, or at least health centers in each village in the future.

Business situation

PSLA and cease-fire with the SLORC, the PSLA were allowed to conduct some Logging business, and were allowed to buy Chines goods to trade in Burma. General San Pwint gave them a permit to do this. However, in 1996, this permit was revoked. This caused many financial problems for the PSLA. One PSLA leader continued to try and trade Chinese goods after the permit was revoked .He brought 10 Chinese mechanized tractors filled with Chinese goods to Mandalay, but was arrested there, together with his vehicles and goods. He was later freed, but all the goods were confiscated. The PSLA is still allowed to operate some tea-factories and some whiskey-distilleries in their area, but they have to pay taxes to the SPDC.

SLORC support for the PSLA 

After the cease-fire agreement, the SLORC provided 900 sacks of rice and 200,000 kyats a month to the PSLA to support their army. However, in 1998,this assistance has been reduced and is not given every month. PSLA spokesman said; "In the future, they will probably not help us anymore, because everything is getting more expensive, including rice, and the Situation to the regime is not good. 

In April 1998, the SPDC gave the order forbidding anyone in Central Burma to transport rice to sell in Northern Shan State. This immediately caused everything to become much more expensive in Nam San. Rice is now 6,500 kyats per small sack, and will probably go up to 8,500 Kats a sack this week. Before, it was about 4,800 Kats per sack. The villagers are now getting worried that the SPDC will put pressure on them again like before the cease-fire, to make the PSLA surrender."

PSLF Information Center
(More information please contact to Tel: 09- 8516218)

Source: http://hmong.8k.com/photo3.html 

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‘We Have to Be Careful With the Language of Federalism’

By SAMANTHA MICHAELS / THE IRRAWADDY| Monday, July 15, 2013 |

Ashley South is an independent consultant and senior adviser for the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), a Norwegian-led group formed at the request of Burma’s government last year to build confidence in the ceasefire and peace processes. (Photo courtesy of Ashley South)

In the ceasefire agreement in Mon State [in 1995], there was a semi-official concession by the government that educators in the state could teach Mon language after school hours, although classes at government schools were officially still taught in Burmese language. Have you heard of similar arrangements being made for ethnic language instruction in other ceasefire agreements?
A: Most of the other armed groups have made these demands, but in terms of an actual discussion, I don’t believe that has started yet. In the peace process, there are quite a range of issues that have been identified by the armed groups—political, social and cultural concerns that need to be addressed. And that’s an important start. There’s an agenda that’s been mapped out by the armed groups, and civil society and political actors, and education and language use is a priority for many of them. There have been some initial discussions in specific peace talks—for example in Chin State, in talks between the Chin National Front and the government in December last year, there was talk about Chin language use, and I think the KNU [Karen National Union] have talked about this. However, I don’t believe there’s been much progress yet in terms of actually a formal agreement on these issues. But at least the subject is on the agenda.
Probably most progress has been made by the New Mon State Party’s Mon National Education Committee, which administers some 300 schools, about half of which are ‘mixed’ schools—government schools, where the MNEC provides some teachers and curriculum materials. I think this is an important model for other parts of the country. The MNEC system provides education in the mother tongue, in this case Mon, especially at the primary level. In middle and high schools, the MNEC system follows the government curriculum in most respects, with additional units on Mon language and history and culture. This means that Mon National School graduates can sit government matriculation exams, and enter the state higher education system, if they choose, while at the same time retaining their ethnic national identity and culture. The Mon system provides ‘the best of both worlds,’ a locally owned and delivered education system, which is nevertheless integrated with the state system, which itself is undergoing significant reforms.

Q: Leaders of the Kachin Independence Army [KIA] have said that before agreeing to a ceasefire, they want the government to hold a more inclusive meeting with all the ethnic groups. The government has reportedly promised to follow through with a meeting in Naypyidaw, maybe even this month. Do you think it will actually happen?
A: I’d have to ‘no comment’ on that. It’s too sensitive! I could say more, in terms of other things that need to happen in the peace process, in a more general sense. Ceasefires are just the first step toward peace. What also needs to happen is the beginning of substantial political discussions. There are some issues which are of great concern to ethnic communities and to non-state armed groups, and which require quite broad participation in order to have a legitimate dialogue. When we’re talking about ceasefires, I think it’s appropriate for the main discussion to be between the government and the Myanmar Army, and the non-state armed groups, because the subject is security. But when it’s getting on to political issues, there are a wide number of stakeholders who would want to be included in discussions—political parties, civil society groups, conflict-affected communities—really, everyone in Myanmar is a stakeholder for political discussions. That makes the logistics of organizing political talks very difficult.
If political talks do not start soon, this will raise questions about whether the peace process is really serious. What distinguishes the peace process now to the ceasefires of the 1990s is that the earlier round of ceasefires occurred in a situation where there was very little chance of real political dialogue at the national level. What underpins the peace process today is a promise and commitment by the president to have substantial political talks with representatives of ethnic communities. That’s an incredibly positive thing—it’s unprecedented in the history of the country, and should be applauded. But the talks haven’t actually started yet, so while the commitment is hugely symbolic and definitely should be supported, it’s important to start those talks sooner rather than later, in order to maintain the momentum in the peace process. The meeting in Chiang Mai [in north Thailand] on Saturday between the Myanmar Peace Center and the UNFC [theUnited Nationalities Federal Council, an alliance of ethnic minority groups] represented a step in the right direction, but can hardly be considered the beginning of substantial political discussions.
There are a number of pressing issues—I think language in schools and government administration is one, but there are also issues, for example, with widespread land-grabbing in a number of areas, and also the proposed implementation of major infrastructure projects in some ethnic areas. Different communities will have their own list of priorities, and armed groups will have their own interests and concerns. One widely held set of concerns relates to the incursion of government authority into previously autonomous, ethnic nationality-populated areas, in the context of the peace process. This is problematic for many communities, and non-state armed groups, who still do not regard the government or Myanmar Army as legitimate. Some of these issues need to be discussed rather urgently.
Q: And with political dialogue, I assume that would encompass discussions about the possibility of creating a federal state? Do you think Burma will likely move along that path, toward federalism?
A: I think it has too, really. Ethnic conflicts in Burma can only be addressed through some kind of federal settlement. However, we have to be careful with the language of federalism for a couple of reasons. There’s a danger that some people from the Myanmar government and the military will hear the language of federalism and think that what is being talked about is the disintegration of the union. I think there needs to be more work done to explain that federalism is something that, for most armed groups and ethnic communities, is a way of strengthening the union. Also, there are many different types of federalism—constitutional politics is quite complex, and any discussion of revising the Constitution will have to involve multiple stakeholders, in a drawn-out and complicated process of negotiation.
In the meantime, it might be useful to explore ways of supporting ethnic education, decentralization and local participation in schooling and other sectors, empowering local agency and communities—which can be achieved by supporting concrete projects on the ground. You don’t necessarily need have to have top-down political change to achieve all these things. So I think federalism is important, but it shouldn’t be considered a panacea, or the only thing that’s necessary in this country.
Q: Critics have said that President Thein Sein has no control of the military, in light of continuing clashes in some areas, such as Kachin State, even though he has called for a ceasefire. Does it seem to you that he lacks control over the military?
A: I wouldn’t say no control. I think there are many different scenarios, but I guess the two main things that people talk about are: Either the government has its reform and peace agendas, and the Myanmar Army has its own responsibilities for security and national defense, and the Myanmar Army might not always have the same priorities or agenda—or interests—as the government. Or there is a conspiracy theory that, actually, behind closed doors the government and the Army have quite well-worked-out “good cop, bad cop” roles: While the government is engaging in reforms and the peace process, the Myanmar Army is at the same time still pursuing a policy of military expansion to defeat the armed groups, one by one. I would not say on the record which one of those I think is more likely, but whichever scenario is correct, I think the reform process has momentum and the peace process has a momentum, which means Myanmar is not going back to a one-party military dictatorship.
Peace and politics are made by doing, and whatever conspiracies, plans or strategies may be in play on the part of the government, the army, the armed groups and international actors—there is a lot of geopolitical interest in Myanmar from different regional and international powers—not any one of those players is really in a position to impose an outcome on the peace process. That makes this an incredibly interesting time to be working in Myanmar. Although there are many substantial problems in the peace process, I don’t think this is a good enough reason to turn one’s back. Rather, I think international support should be undertaken in a way that builds trust and confidence—but at the same time tests—the realities of the peace process, and above all attempts to ‘do no harm,’ by not exposing already vulnerable communities to increased risk. We also have to keep our eyes on the big picture, which is inherently political. Peace will not come to Burma as a result of technical fixes, or even widespread economic development, but only in the context of the discussions between different stakeholders, at different levels, on the relationship between state and society, which, as I said, is an inherently political process.
<<Sources:www.irrawaddy.org>>

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