‘We Have to Be Careful With the Language of Federalism’
Ashley
South is an independent consultant and senior adviser for the Myanmar
Peace Support Initiative (MPSI), a Norwegian-led group formed at the
request of Burma’s government last year to build confidence in the
ceasefire and peace processes. (Photo courtesy of Ashley South)
In the ceasefire agreement in Mon State [in 1995], there was a
semi-official concession by the government that educators in the state
could teach Mon language after school hours, although classes at
government schools were officially still taught in Burmese language.
Have you heard of similar arrangements being made for ethnic language
instruction in other ceasefire agreements?
A: Most of the other armed groups have made these
demands, but in terms of an actual discussion, I don’t believe that has
started yet. In the peace process, there are quite a range of issues
that have been identified by the armed groups—political, social and
cultural concerns that need to be addressed. And that’s an important
start. There’s an agenda that’s been mapped out by the armed groups, and
civil society and political actors, and education and language use is a
priority for many of them. There have been some initial discussions in
specific peace talks—for example in Chin State, in talks between the
Chin National Front and the government in December last year, there was
talk about Chin language use, and I think the KNU [Karen National Union]
have talked about this. However, I don’t believe there’s been much
progress yet in terms of actually a formal agreement on these issues.
But at least the subject is on the agenda.
Probably most progress has been made by the New Mon State Party’s Mon
National Education Committee, which administers some 300 schools, about
half of which are ‘mixed’ schools—government schools, where the MNEC
provides some teachers and curriculum materials. I think this is an
important model for other parts of the country. The MNEC system provides
education in the mother tongue, in this case Mon, especially at the
primary level. In middle and high schools, the MNEC system follows the
government curriculum in most respects, with additional units on Mon
language and history and culture. This means that Mon National School
graduates can sit government matriculation exams, and enter the state
higher education system, if they choose, while at the same time
retaining their ethnic national identity and culture. The Mon system
provides ‘the best of both worlds,’ a locally owned and delivered
education system, which is nevertheless integrated with the state
system, which itself is undergoing significant reforms.
Q:
Leaders of the Kachin Independence Army [KIA]
have said that before agreeing to a ceasefire, they want the government
to hold a more inclusive meeting with all the ethnic groups. The
government has reportedly promised to follow through with a meeting in
Naypyidaw, maybe even this month. Do you think it will actually happen?
A: I’d have to ‘no comment’ on that. It’s too
sensitive! I could say more, in terms of other things that need to
happen in the peace process, in a more general sense. Ceasefires are
just the first step toward peace. What also needs to happen is the
beginning of substantial political discussions. There are some issues
which are of great concern to ethnic communities and to non-state armed
groups, and which require quite broad participation in order to have a
legitimate dialogue. When we’re talking about ceasefires, I think it’s
appropriate for the main discussion to be between the government and the
Myanmar Army, and the non-state armed groups, because the subject is
security. But when it’s getting on to political issues, there are a wide
number of stakeholders who would want to be included in
discussions—political parties, civil society groups, conflict-affected
communities—really, everyone in Myanmar is a stakeholder for political
discussions. That makes the logistics of organizing political talks very
difficult.
If political talks do not start soon, this will raise questions about
whether the peace process is really serious. What distinguishes the
peace process now to the ceasefires of the 1990s is that the earlier
round of ceasefires occurred in a situation where there was very little
chance of real political dialogue at the national level. What underpins
the peace process today is a promise and commitment by the president to
have substantial political talks with representatives of ethnic
communities. That’s an incredibly positive thing—it’s unprecedented in
the history of the country, and should be applauded. But the talks
haven’t actually started yet, so while the commitment is hugely symbolic
and definitely should be supported, it’s important to start those talks
sooner rather than later, in order to maintain the momentum in the
peace process. The meeting in Chiang Mai [in north Thailand] on Saturday
between the Myanmar Peace Center and the UNFC [theUnited Nationalities
Federal Council, an alliance of ethnic minority groups] represented a
step in the right direction, but can hardly be considered the beginning
of substantial political discussions.
There are a number of pressing issues—I think language in schools and
government administration is one, but there are also issues, for
example, with widespread land-grabbing in a number of areas, and also
the proposed implementation of major infrastructure projects in some
ethnic areas. Different communities will have their own list of
priorities, and armed groups will have their own interests and concerns.
One widely held set of concerns relates to the incursion of government
authority into previously autonomous, ethnic nationality-populated
areas, in the context of the peace process. This is problematic for many
communities, and non-state armed groups, who still do not regard the
government or Myanmar Army as legitimate. Some of these issues need to
be discussed rather urgently.
Q:
And with political dialogue, I assume that
would encompass discussions about the possibility of creating a federal
state? Do you think Burma will likely move along that path, toward
federalism?
A: I think it has too, really. Ethnic conflicts in
Burma can only be addressed through some kind of federal settlement.
However, we have to be careful with the language of federalism for a
couple of reasons. There’s a danger that some people from the Myanmar
government and the military will hear the language of federalism and
think that what is being talked about is the disintegration of the
union. I think there needs to be more work done to explain that
federalism is something that, for most armed groups and ethnic
communities, is a way of strengthening the union. Also, there are many
different types of federalism—constitutional politics is quite complex,
and any discussion of revising the Constitution will have to involve
multiple stakeholders, in a drawn-out and complicated process of
negotiation.
In the meantime, it might be useful to explore ways of supporting
ethnic education, decentralization and local participation in schooling
and other sectors, empowering local agency and communities—which can be
achieved by supporting concrete projects on the ground. You don’t
necessarily need have to have top-down political change to achieve all
these things. So I think federalism is important, but it shouldn’t be
considered a panacea, or the only thing that’s necessary in this
country.
Q:
Critics have said that President Thein Sein
has no control of the military, in light of continuing clashes in some
areas, such as Kachin State, even though he has called for a ceasefire.
Does it seem to you that he lacks control over the military?
A: I wouldn’t say no control. I think there are many
different scenarios, but I guess the two main things that people talk
about are: Either the government has its reform and peace agendas, and
the Myanmar Army has its own responsibilities for security and national
defense, and the Myanmar Army might not always have the same priorities
or agenda—or interests—as the government. Or there is a conspiracy
theory that, actually, behind closed doors the government and the Army
have quite well-worked-out “good cop, bad cop” roles: While the
government is engaging in reforms and the peace process, the Myanmar
Army is at the same time still pursuing a policy of military expansion
to defeat the armed groups, one by one. I would not say on the record
which one of those I think is more likely, but whichever scenario is
correct, I think the reform process has momentum and the peace process
has a momentum, which means Myanmar is not going back to a one-party
military dictatorship.
Peace and politics are made by doing, and whatever conspiracies,
plans or strategies may be in play on the part of the government, the
army, the armed groups and international actors—there is a lot of
geopolitical interest in Myanmar from different regional and
international powers—not any one of those players is really in a
position to impose an outcome on the peace process. That makes this an
incredibly interesting time to be working in Myanmar. Although there are
many substantial problems in the peace process, I don’t think this is a
good enough reason to turn one’s back. Rather, I think international
support should be undertaken in a way that builds trust and
confidence—but at the same time tests—the realities of the peace
process, and above all attempts to ‘do no harm,’ by not exposing already
vulnerable communities to increased risk. We also have to keep our eyes
on the big picture, which is inherently political. Peace will not come
to Burma as a result of technical fixes, or even widespread economic
development, but only in the context of the discussions between
different stakeholders, at different levels, on the relationship between
state and society, which, as I said, is an inherently political
process.
<<Sources:
www.irrawaddy.org>>